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CASES NOTED
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - SURGICAL LIABILITY
Plaintiff was injured by the physician's administration of an anestheti-
zation procedure which the plaintiff had expressly prohibited. The jury
found that no emergency existed and judgment was awarded for the plaintiff.
Held, affirmed, an action for a technical trespass lies where a physician acts
contrary to the patient's express prohibition in the absence of an emergency
situation. Chambers Y,. Nottebaum, 96 So.2d 716 (Fla. Ct. of App. 1957).
At the common law, the patient's express consent was necessary for the
performance of any surgical operation.' The only exception to this rule was
in cases termed emergency situations. 2 The exception was based upon im-
plied consent.8 It has been contended, however, that a more accurate
description would be that a physician, by reason of the emergency, is priv-
ileged to act as though consent had been given.
4
Upon the widespread use of anesthetics which render the patient uncon-
scious,5 another class of cases began to arise. The physician, after having
undertaken an authorized operation, sometimes met with unanticipated con-
ditions or reactions on the part of his patient which required, or at some
future time might require, additional surgery. The patient's unconscious
condition prevented him from giving express consent to the action found
necessary by the surgeon, and the surgeon sometimes rendered the unauth-
orized treatment of his own accord.6 In most cases arising as a result of
unauthorized extensions of authorized surgery, courts have held the com-
1. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 263, 104 N. W. 12 (1905); Hively v. Higgs, 120
Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927); Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, 2 WILS. K. B. 359, 95
Eng. Dep. 860 (1767); 41 AM. JUR. 222 Physicians andSurgeons § 108 (1942).
2. Where some immediate action is found necessary for the preservation of the life
or health of the patient and it is impractical or impossible to first obtain consent to the
operation which the surgeon deems to be immediately necessary. Cotnam v. Wisdom,
83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Calif. App. 2d 776, 208
P. 2d 68 (1949); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S. W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951) (mere endangering of
life sometime in the future is not an emergency raising implied consent); Bennan v. Par-
sonnett, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 At. 948 (1912) (imminent threat to life or grave or irrepar-
able injury to health); Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943)
(emergency must endanger life at present moment).
3. Where there is an emergency, it may be implied that the patient consents to
the exercise of emergency treatment. Cases cited at note 2 supra. See also Mohr v.
Williams, 95 Minn. 263, 104 N. W. 12 (1905) (where application of doctrine is dis-
cussed but not employed); 70 C. J. S. 967 Physicians and Surgeons § 48 (1951).
4. PROSSER, IORTS § 18, p. 84 (2d ed. 1955).
5. The first widespread use of ether anesthetization began in about 1846. 1 ENcyc.
BaIT. 862(1951).
6. Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (held a battery where for an
operation to remove a small cyst, the physician removed a large cyst); Church v. Adler,
350 11 App. 471, 113 N.E. 2d 327 (1953) (held a battery where physician remove
inflamed appendix during an operation for the removal of diseased ovaries); Franklyn v.
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mission of a technical trespass,7 relying on the same common law rule as
set out above - that a physician operates at his peril when he does not first
obtain the patient's express consent or that of the patient's parent if the
patient is a ninor. The rule is qualified in this class of cases, too, by the
existence of an emergency situation.
It was recognized in the early part of this century that the introduction
of anesthesia into the practice of surgery had modified application of the
comnon law rule in certain fundamental respects of which the law must
take notice." Before setting forth the several theories which have been
advanced in an effort to better adapt the law to the requirements of modern
surgery, it might prove helpful to examine the cases which give rise to
technical trespass suits against physicians.
The cases appear to fall into three separate groups: First, there are the
strict emergency cases, arising either out of an accident"0 or during the
course of an authorized surgery." Second, there are the cases in which a
physician discovers, during the course of an authorized surgery for the cor-
rection of a particular set of symptoms, that additional or different causes
from those contemplated are responsible for the patient's symptoms and
condition.' 2 For purposes of this discussion, we shall label these latter cases
as the "symptomatic" class. The third class of cases involve the physician's
discovery, during the course of authorized surgery, of additional conditions,
not contributing to the symptoms of which the patient complained, but
which, in the physician's best professional judgment, should be remedied at
Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 681 (1930) (held a battery where physician, upon
discovery of unexpected condition, made small skin graft in correcting stiffness of finger);
Nlohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 263, 104 N. W. 12 (1905) (held a battery where physician
operated upon a more serious condition in the left ear in addition to a condition of the
right car the correction of which patient had consented to); Ilively v. Higgs, 120 Ore.
588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927) (held a battery where physician removed tonsils during opera-
tion on septum),
7. Cases cited note 6 sizfra.
8. Jackovach v. Yocoi, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931) (where parent
could not be contacted in emergency, consent was implied); Wells v. McGee, 39 So. 2d
196 (La. App. 1949) (where parent could not be contacted in emergency, consent was
implied).
9. "'lThe scope of modern surgery has been enlarged; legal rules must extend beyond
emergencies of actual surgery to other matters more or less vitally affecting the patient's
welfare. To meet these changed conditions, the rule of law must, in the interest of
doctor and patient alike, be adapted to the changes which have been wrought." Bennan
v. Parsonnett, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
10. Jackovach v. Yukon, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. XV, 444 (1941) (injury by train);
Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912) (injury by train).
11. Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. V. 168 (1928) (Surgeon could
remove obstruction which lie himself had introduced into urinary system); Barnett v.
Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (1). C. Mun. App. 1943) (Removal of appendix during opera-
tion for a tubal pregnancy allowed where acute condition endangered lives of mother
and child).
12. Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (Small cyst anticipated but large
cyst discovered and removed); Bennan v. Parsonnett, 83 N, J. L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912)
(Rupture anticipated on left side was more serious on right side).
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the moment, not for reasons of emergency but because the moment is oppor-
tune.13 Let us label this group of cases as the "additional condition" group.
With reference to the emergency class of cases, the use of the doctrine
of privilege 14 seems to best satisfy the situation. It requires little rationali-
zation nor the use of implied consent to allow a physician the privilege of
saving life or acting to prevent "grave or irreparable injury to health" in all
emergency situation.
The remaining two groups of cases present different problems, both of
which appear to be susceptible of better solution than that of the application
of the doctrine of implied consent. The latter doctrine does not seem fairly
applicable where the extension is made for reasons of good surgery, con-
venience to the patient or remedying the symptoms complained of rather
than to meet an emergency. The use of implied consent in such instances
is simply a case of applying the wrong tool, one no more suited to its
purpose than the use of a screwdriver to hammer a nail. Some of the decided
cases are expressive of better solutions to the second and third problem
areas. It has been suggested that a patient who voluntarily submits himself
to a surgeon for treatment, relying entirely upon the surgeon's skill and care,
gives a general consent to such operation as may, in the surgeon's skill and
professional judgment, be reasonably necessary.'5 The broad consent in-
herent in the application of this rule is sufficient to cover both the sympto-
matic and additional condition cases. A recent law review comment advo-
cates, too, the test of reasonableness in cases of unauthorized extensions.'6
This test is the broadest and most flexible one that might be used. Its prime
criticism is that it places too much discretion in the hands of a surgeon.
To meet this assault it must be pointed out that the test would have little
effect where the patient expressly prohibited treatment or operative measures
beyond that to which he expressly consents. A complete disclosure and dis-
cussion by the surgeon and his patient of the patient's condition and the
forthcoming operation would go far toward eliminating misunderstanding
(and law suits) on the part of each.
In Kennedy v. Parrott,'7 the court permitted extension to remedy an
abnormal or diseased condition within the area of the original incision.' 8
This particular device might be helpful in certain cases, but seems limited
13. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d. 754 (1956) (Physician pierced
cysts on ovaries during appendicitis operation); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac.
363 (1927) (Physician removed tonsils during operation on septum).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) (Physician made exploratory
incision and discovering Fallopian tubes infected removed them. Held not a trespass.
After suggesting the rationale set forth in the text, infra, the court attempted to justify
its holding by finding an implied consent and hinting at the existence of an emergency.
A finding of express, general consent would appear to have been more sound.).
16. 4 U. C. L. A. L. Rzv. 627 (1957).
17. 243 N. C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
18. Id. at 362, 90 S. E. 2d at 759.
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in some respects. It is inapplicable, of course, to the instant case and others
like it where no actual incision was involved, but rather a pre-operative
anesthetization procedure. In addition, it does not appear to allow for an
extension of the original incision even for the purpose of remedying the
symptoms for which the operation is being made.
The Kennedy case seems to suggest two other alternatives. 1 The first
is that the surgeon may make any reasonable extension which is in accord
with good surgical practice. 20 This would answer the criticism to the first
test suggested in the case and seems more closely allied with the test of
reasonableness already discussed. The second suggestion is that the patient
may be taken to have consented to any surgery which will relieve him of the
afflictions with which he is suffering. 21 This latter suggestion seems to be
a highly realistic one in the sense that most patients complain of symptoms
rather than specific ailncnts or conditions. This method would appear to
be the best solution to the symptomatic group of cases. The test seems to
be specific enough to restrict its use to that class of cases. There would be
no confusion in applying the policy to cases which fall into either the
emergency or additional condition groups.
The greatest problem, then, lies in the solution of the additional con-
dition cases. The best available solution to this group of cases is probably
the application of the test of reasonableness. Some extensions would un-
questionably be unwarranted and in such cases there would certainly be
misconduct on the physician's part amounting to technical trespass. There
might be other cases, however, in which the extension is reasonable and
in accord with good surgery. In the latter cases not only is no harm done,
but, quite to the contrary, a benefit and convenience has been conferred
upon the patient.
Any of the proposed theories under which a surgeon's liability for an
extension might be determined must be examined in terms of the patient's
right to be protected.
"Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first and greatest
right, which underlies all others - the right to the inviolability of his person;
in other words, the right to himself - is the subject of universal acquiescence,
and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful
or eminent . . . . to violate, without permission, the bodily integrity of
his patient .... ,,22
In the Chambers case, Florida becomes another of the states giving
respect to the common law rule which requires express or implied consent
19. For an interesting discussion of the case see note, 6 DuKE L. J. 41 (1957).
20. 243 N. C. 355, 363, 90 S. E. 2d 754 at 759.
21. Id. at 363, 90 S. E. 2d at 760.
22. Chambers v. Nottebaumn, 96 So. 2d 716 at 718 (Fla. Ct. of App. 1957) citing
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. V. 12 (1905).
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to surgery. The facts of the instant case made it unnecessary to decide the
application of any other rule but that of absolute consent. A physician will
always be held liable where he extends an operation in contravention of the
patient's express prohibition2 3 and in the absence of an emergency situation.2'
Here, the patient had expressly prohibited the use of a spinal anes-
thetic. 25 When the patient reacted convulsively to the administration of
sodium penathol, the physician directed the use of a spinal anesthetic which
application caused an injury to the patient's leg. The jury was instructed
in the application of the strict consent theory and the exception arising under
the emergency situation. 26 Although there was some conflict in testimony
concerning the acuity of the patient's condition,27 the jury found that no
emergency existed.
The decision in the instant case seems proper in the case of an extension
expressly prohibited by the patient. It appears to be a rule which will go
unchanged. The mitigating emergency doctrine is available to prevent unjust
results. In situations where there is no express prohibition, however, it is
to be hoped that Florida will adopt a solution which is better adapted to
the changes which have come about in modern surgery.
The doctrine upon which the common law rule is based has in modem
times becomes very much a fiction. It is an affront to the intelligence of
the most liberal to maintain that a patient could possibly give his express
consent specifically to each of the myriad processes involved in even the
simplest surgery. It is more obviously a fairy tale to speak in terms of
implied consent. The use of one or a combination of the suggestions
advanced earlier, or others which may have been neglected, would go far
toward eliminating the necessity of dealing with the ghost of implied consent.
The instant decision is in no way inconsistent with the use of any
of the suggested solutions in cases of extensions of surgery which may arise.
It may be hoped that, in the event such a situation does arise, the Florida
courts will meet the challenge with a solution better geared to the realities
of medical progress and practice than the rule still in vogue in most juris-
dictions of the United States.
HARVEY I. REISMAN
23. Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 Pac. 683 (1924); Rolater v. Strain,
39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 936 (1913).
24. 41 AM. JuR. 222, 223 Physicians and Surgeons § 110, (1942).
25. For an interesting discussion of the application of res ipsa loquitur in injury suits
resulting from spinal penetrations in administration of anesthesia see comment, 6 CLE.,
MAR. L. REv. 461 (1957).
26. Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 721, 722 (Fla. Ct. of App. 1957).
27. Id. at 720.
